New article: Haiti - How US terrorist designations could deepen criminal rule and humanitarian tragedy

On 08 May, the GI-TOC published an article I co-authored with Romain Le Cour Grandmaison on the designation by the US of a Haitian gang coalition, as well as a separate gang, as foreign terrorist organizations. It details the potential impacts of the designation on humanitarian assistance and criminality.

The article can be found here: https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/haiti-how-us-terrorist-designations-could-deepen-criminal-rule-and-humanitarian-tragedy/

It is reprinted below:

Haiti: How US terrorist designations could deepen criminal rule and humanitarian tragedy

In the first quarter of 2025, at least 1 617 people were killed in Haiti. As the gangs have tightened their grip over the country, the need for aid is intensifying – more than a million people have been displaced and more than half of the population needs humanitarian assistance, a 9 per cent increase against 2024. Criminal groups have recently launched new offensives, particularly in the Central Plateau and Artibonite regions. The population of these areas risk joining the millions in the capital, Port-au-Prince, who already live under the de facto authority of gangs. 

In this constantly deteriorating situation, on 2 May 2025 the United States designated the Viv Ansanm gang coalition and the Gran Grif gang as foreign terrorist organizations and specially designated global terrorists. The measures bar members of the designated gangs from accessing financial institutions with a US link, and from being issued visas. They also provide for potential legal action and secondary sanctions against individuals or organizations providing various forms of support to the gangs.  

The action is the latest use of counterterrorism measures as a tool to combat organized crime, building on a previous tranche of US designations targeting Latin American gangs and cartels. However, the US designations may inadvertently worsen the situation on the ground by impeding humanitarian assistance, strengthening gang governance and empowering broader criminal networks. This may drive further entrenchment of designees in the illicit political economy. But in the short term, the most pressing concern is whether the US designations will prevent Haitian and international NGOs from continuing to deliver aid to communities in gang-controlled areas that lack public services.  

For NGOs working in areas under gang control in Haiti, as in other locations, negotiating access with criminal leaders is often a necessary condition for reaching affected populations. In such contexts, it is these non-state actors (and not official authorities) who dictate the terms of engagement, effectively exercising control over communities and restricting humanitarian access. Under prevailing sanctions regimes, these dynamics expose humanitarian organizations to legal and reputational risks, including potential liability for engaging – even indirectly – with sanctioned or criminal entities.  There is therefore growing concern within the aid community that organizations could lose funding or face legal risks – including prosecution. Under the terrorist designation, the assistance they provide could now be classified as ‘material support’ to terrorist groups. 

The inability to provide assistance could also indirectly deepen gang governance. If people find themselves even more isolated than they are today, living under the thumb of criminal leaders, the bargaining power of those bosses will be strengthened. Gangs are also likely to increase the pressure they exert through widespread extortion and territorial expansion to secure their sources of income. Finally, a halt to humanitarian support could be used by criminal leaders as another element of propaganda against international action in Haiti, which Viv Ansanm regularly condemns as foreign interference. 

‘Invisible’ exemptions  

US policy provides mechanisms to mitigate these risks, to the extent that exemptions exist to allow humanitarian activities to continue in such contexts. In December 2022, the US Department of the Treasury’s  Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) issued a series of general licences that authorize certain humanitarian activities that might otherwise be prohibited under US sanctions programmes, including those targeted at terrorist actors. These were introduced as part of the implementation of the UN’s Security Council resolution 2664, which authorized a humanitarian exemption to asset freezes in various UN sanctions regimes.  

The issuing of these licences underscores the US government’s recognition of the complexities involved in conducting humanitarian operations in sanctioned jurisdictions. In the past, such measures have been taken to ensure that the provision of humanitarian aid is not impeded by overly stringent sanctions enforcement. Notably, the licences are self-executing, meaning that entities or individuals who reasonably determine that their activities fall within the scope of the authorization may proceed without needing to obtain pre-approval or additional guidance from the OFAC. 

Alarmingly, however, and reflecting the wider lack of strategic coherence currently blighting Haiti, whether these exemptions continue to apply in the face of the new designations does not appear to have been communicated to the humanitarian sector – either by the US authorities, the Haitian government or international partners.  

Therefore, despite this legal framework, there are concerns about its implementation on the ground, particularly in Haiti. The Trump administration’s commitment to the general licences issued under the Biden administration is uncertain. There is also lack of clarity in terms of how and to what extent NGOs working in Haiti are familiar with or can rely on the general licences. And questions remain about the coordination of these efforts with the Haitian authorities. The lack of a clearly articulated and coordinated strategy casts doubt on the effectiveness of these measures in practice. 

Fuelling the underworld?  

From a more structural perspective, the ability of humanitarian actors to carry out their operations is directly linked to their ability to access international financial services, which could be cut off or hampered in the context of sanctions. The perceived legal and operational risks associated with sanctions compliance may lead financial institutions and money transfer companies to scale back or even withdraw from Haiti. For example, companies such as Western Union may reduce or cease operations in the country due to potential exposure under US law, even if their activities are technically authorized.  

The broader concern is that a strict or inconsistent interpretation of sanctions might lead to widespread de-risking, whereby financial institutions disengage entirely from high-risk regions. Unable to use formal banking channels, NGOs are often forced to rely on informal systems, increasing operational risks and reducing oversight.  

This constrained operating environment also creates space for criminal networks and illicit actors to exploit the aid vacuum, which in the medium and long term could expand rather than constrain the power and scope of the gangs and associated illicit economies in Haiti. 

Regulated financial channels are heavily used by the diaspora to send remittances and by Haitian businesses to move funds. With those potentially blocked, unregulated intermediaries – including some fintech companies and money services businesses – could step in to facilitate transactions, potentially without adequate scrutiny. This not only hampers humanitarian access, but also risks increasing informality, further weakening local institutions and strengthening criminal financing structures. 

Previous research by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) has underscored how far-reaching sanctions have a shaping impact on criminal economies – such as in Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic – with criminal actors exploiting new opportunities for profit. Moreover, the experience of Somalia provides a relevant comparative example. In response to the terrorist designation of al-Shabaab by the US, the UN and others in the international community, major banks cut ties with Somali money services businesses and clients, leading to a significant reduction in formal financial access. This, in turn, affected remittances from the diaspora and increased reliance on informal financial networks, which are more vulnerable to exploitation by criminal actors and can facilitate money laundering and other illicit activities.  

In the case of Somalia, de-risking in response to the terrorist designation arguably exacerbated rather than mitigated the risks posed by terrorism and criminality, such as by expanding financial channels used for arms trafficking. In the Haitian context, it is critical that US authorities engage with banks and money services businesses to prevent such de-risking. At the same time, however, humanitarian actors should prepare for the possibility of disruptions to remittances and financial access, and consider how this might affect humanitarian needs and their own operations. 

A 180-degree turn is urgently needed 

Without appropriate safeguards, the terrorist designations risk further destabilizing Haiti and inadvertently empowering gang structures, which previous GI-TOC research suggests are likely to remain largely unaffected by sanctions alone. And, without coordination with a clear security and judicial strategy, particularly to dismantle political-criminal networks, the designations risk becoming yet another policy tool that is poorly used or not used at all.  

It is troubling that these designations have not been accompanied by robust engagement, strategic coordination or technical support from the United States, the Haitian authorities and the international community. Immediate action is needed to provide clarity, facilitate the work of NGOs and ensure the continued delivery of life-saving assistance to a population whose latest misfortune is to have been left vulnerable to the rule of armed criminal groups. 

New Article: US sanctions missing their mark

On 15 May, the GI-TOC published an article I co-authored with Lucia Bird and Flore Berger on the designation by the US of seven Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin leaders, based on their involvement in kidnapping of Americans for ransom.

The article can be found here: https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/us-sanctions-jnim-kidnappings-west-north-africa-sahel/

It is reprinted below:

US sanctions missing their mark

On 23 April, the United States State Department and the Treasury imposed sanctions on seven leaders of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), a violent extremist group operating in the Maghreb and West Africa. Designees include Iyad ag Ghali, JNIM’s leader, and Amadou Kouffa, the leader of the Katiba Macina, a member of the JNIM coalition, among others.  

It is not the first time that JNIM and its leaders have been sanctioned. Iyad ag Ghali, for example, has been sanctioned by the UN since 2013. However, the recent designations stand out for their approach. The April sanctions are designed mainly to deter wrongful detention of American citizens, and were issued under a new sanctions regime, laid out in Executive Order 14078, ‘Bolstering Efforts To Bring Hostages and Wrongfully Detained United States Nationals Home’. 

The executive order allows for the sanctioning of a host of actors, including militant groups, criminal organizations and state agents who engage in, or play a role in supporting, hostage taking of US nationals for political or financial gain. It is meant to ‘deter and … impose tangible consequences on those responsible for, or complicit in, hostage-taking or the wrongful detention of a United States national abroad.’  

In practice, however, the executive order has hitherto only been used to sanction state-affiliated agencies and individuals, such as Russia’s Federal Security Service, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The designation of senior JNIM members therefore represents a shift in scope, signalling the sanction regime can also be used to target non-state actors – in this case terrorists – who engage in kidnapping and hostage taking. 

It is also an acknowledgement of how JNIM has emerged as the most dominant group behind the kidnapping for ransom market across the Sahel and the wider region. The critical importance of the kidnapping market for JNIM is reflected in the individuals designated, who include JNIM leaders in charge of operations and those with core organizational roles (including the head of finance and a main negotiator for the release of foreign hostages). ‘JNIM relies on hostage-taking and wrongful detention of civilians in order to gain leverage and instill fear, creating anguish and misery for the victims and their families,’ said Brian E. Nelson, the US’s Department of the Treasury’s under-secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence.  

However, while these sanctions will be seen as a high-profile move by the US to counter kidnapping, their impacts are likely to be limited, as they are out of step with the local realities of JNIM’s role in the contemporary Sahelian kidnapping ‘industry’.  

The nature of the kidnapping market has shifted since early in the first decade of the 2000s. Then, most kidnappings undertaken by armed groups in the Sahel (including JNIM’s predecessor groups) were motivated by financial gains. The kidnapping industry was a major source of revenue for armed groups at the time. It is estimated that between 2006 and 2012, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, one of JNIM’s predecessor groups, received €60 million in ransom payments. Their predominant targets were Westerners, including US nationals. 

Since the middle-2010s, however, the number of foreigners kidnapped for ransom has significantly declined. This is largely due to a dwindling number of potential targets as foreigners left high-risk areas or those under the influence of violent extremist groups. Since then, there have been only a small number of sporadic incidents of foreigners being kidnapped, including the abduction of an American nun from a convent in Burkina Faso, who was released in August 2022, in exchange for an imprisoned JNIM actor. Today, foreigners constitute only a tiny proportion of kidnapping incidents and have become a less important source of financing for JNIM. 

Meanwhile, kidnapping of locals has surged in the region since the late 2010s. There were more than 2 000 kidnappings recorded by ACLED between 2017 and April 2024 across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger (accounting for around 13% of all violent incidents), and Sahelian civilians were the target of over 98% of them. JNIM was identified as the perpetrator in 50% of recorded kidnappings across this period. 

While hostage-taking of foreigners has drawn substantial press and policy attention outside the region, only sporadic international interest has been shown in the growing kidnapping ecosystem targeting West African nationals. 

Moreover, in the current Sahelian kidnapping industry, the majority of kidnapping incidents by JNIM – which constitute a significant proportion of total incidents – do not appear to be predominantly motivated by money. Instead, kidnappings have become a key tool used as part of JNIM’s wider strategies for infiltrating and consolidating control over territories. The group appears to use kidnapping primarily for the purposes of intelligence gathering, forced recruitment, punishment and intimidation – as assessed in further detail in these reports analyzing JNIM’s use of kidnapping in Burkina Faso and in northern Benin.  

The implications of kidnapping for ransom extend beyond the victims, and pose serious stability challenges. Several West African countries have been destabilized by insurgencies, which began in Mali in 2012. Our research shows that kidnapping is one of a number of ‘accelerant’ illicit markets in West Africa, alongside arms trafficking and cattle rustling. Such markets stand out for their role in fuelling instability and violence, and are enabled by conflict. Kidnapping in particular is a mechanism through which armed groups exert their control through violent governance in the central Sahel.  

The April sanctions highlighting JNIM’s role in the Sahelian kidnapping industry are a significant move, in that they represent the most high-profile international action targeting kidnapping perpetrators in recent years.  However, they are unlikely to have a material impact, given that most of the recently designated JNIM members are already under sanction, typically travel little beyond the region, while the group as a whole earns most of its revenue from other licit and illicit markets locally. In this sense, it is likely to prove a blunt instrument. 

To effect change, a broader, coordinated regional and international response to the kidnapping industry is required, drawing together local, national, regional and international stakeholders. Any effective response – such as further sanctions, law enforcement coordination, targeted aid support and strengthening the part played by civil society in vulnerable communities – needs to be tailored to the kidnapping challenge faced first and foremost by West Africans, and not just Westerners.  

Responses that focus only on kidnapping threats faced by Westerners are unlikely to gain any traction within the Sahel and West Africa, and are doomed to miss the mark. A more meaningful way to mitigate risks of Western hostage taking in the region is to comprehensively address the far broader and more acute threat posed by the kidnapping ecosystem preying upon locals. 

New Reports on the use of sanctions against Organized Crime

I’m delighted to have launched three reports in recent months which focus on the use of targeted sanctions to counter organized crime

The first is titled “Convergence Zone: The Evolution of Targeted Sanctions Usage Against Transnational Organized Crime.” It looks at the evolution of sanctions regimes and policy targeting organized crime, in the US, UN, EU and UK systems. It further details the processes these jurisdictions use in sanctioning. It is available here.

For those looking for highlights of the report, an executive briefing of the above report has also been produced. It is available here.

Finally, I just published “Hard Targets: Identifying a framework of objectives for targeted sanctions on illicit economies.” This report develops a tailored framework for assessing the strategic goals of sanctions regimes and groups of linked designations focused on TOC, as well as of individual designation objectives. The development of this framework is meant to create a tool to both better analyze the impact of TOC-focused sanctions and to design better sanctioning approaches. The report can be found here.