Hoping for Brave New World

Originally Published by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, Available Here.

The boat was packed. Five hundred men and women were on board, hailing from Ghana, Somalia Eritrea, and a kaleidoscope of other countries. Sailing north from the Libyan coast the boat was within sight of its destination when it began taking on water, and then capsized. While coast guard vessels rescued some of the migrants, few knew how to swim. The bodies floating in the surf off the Italian island of Lampadusa were a grim reminder of the desperate journey many embark on for a better life, and the often-fatal dangers they face.

While migration is no crime, the challenges of negotiating complex immigration or asylum procedures in destination countries, or transiting the complex geographical routes across inhospitable terrains leads many to seek the assistance of smuggling groups to help them navigate their passage. As a consequence, migrant smuggling is becoming all pervasive in the modern world. Migrant smuggling denotes a situation in which an individual willing contracts with a third party to be transported into another country without having formal documentation or consent to enter that country.

The demand for illicit migration is driven by the economic discrepancies between the developed and developing world. The salaries of Europe, the U.S., Canada, and Australia far higher than what can be earned in many developing countries. For millions of young adults facing bleak job market in low-income areas of Africa, Latin America, and Asia, the most viable way to achieve financial success is to engage in a risky, and often unsuccessful migration to the developed world. Others, fleeing from war or oppressive governments, may have little choice but to migrate and hope for the best.

Specialized migrant smuggling organizations have arisen to cater to this demand. The market is lucrative, generating more than $6.75 billion annually for the groups involved. Migrant smuggling is often facilitated by a vast number of different groups, each specializing in moving people through one distinct geographic area. Some of the gangs are highly complex, able to supply doctored passports or maintain fleets of migrant smuggling vessels. More frequently, the smugglers are minimally organized and low tech. Successfully moving someone across a land border requires an intimate knowledge of the territory and the operational habits of border guards, creating a low bar for prospective migrant smugglers who live alongside an international border.

The largest flows of illicit migrants move via two well defined corridors: from Central America into the United States, and from Africa into Europe. The Latin America-US corridor is one of the most well-traveled illicit migration routes in the world. Migrants, mainly from Mexico, Central, and South America, along with smaller numbers of Asian and African migrants, attempt to cross Mexico’s border with the U.S. in areas that are remote yet have access to roads. Historically most the migrant smugglers in the area have been small, locally based organizations. This has shifted over the last decade, as Mexico’s powerful drug trafficking organizations have moved into the market. The UNODC Global Threat Assessment estimated that this high traffic route may be used by upwards of three million migrants every year.

The other large migration corridor extends from Africa to Europe. Routes extend from sub-Saharan Africa either across the Saharan desert and on to the North African Coast, or to the West African coast. At either of these end points, the smuggled migrants face a daunting sea voyage. From West Africa, migrants attempt to reach Spain’s Canary Islands. From North Africa, migrants attempt to cross the Mediterranean, often aiming for Italy. Historically, the number of migrants smuggled along these routes and into Europe has been a far smaller than what is seen along the US-Mexico border, but with the increasing instability in North Africa and the Sahel, these numbers have been rising exponentially. 92 migrants were recently found dead in the northern deserts towards the Libyan border, the majority of which were children. A European intelligence officer recently estimated that 3000 migrants pass through the Agadez region of Niger each week, and that represents fifty per cent of the migrants landing on the shores of Lampedusa.

Whichever route they take, smuggled migrants often face extreme danger. Once outside of their own country, they become dependent on smuggling groups for their survival. This dependence can open the smuggled individual to physical and sexual abuse at the hands of the smugglers, as well as forced labour and coercive demands for money. The line between migrant smuggling and human trafficking is particularly fine. Migrants may start off a journey as willing participants, however their vulnerability can lead to their exploitation at the hands of criminal groups. Finally, corrupt security officials who control the areas migrants must pass through also frequently victimize them.

Migrant smuggling is unlikely to dissipate in the near future. Populations are continuing to grow in many nations in the developing world, creating a fierce battle for available jobs. Young adults who are financially and physically able are likely to continue to try to reach high-wage countries in North America and Europe. While for some the migration will end happily, for far too many their efforts to get a better life will lead to abuse, injury, or death in the clear waters of the Mediterranean or somewhere in the vast Sahara.

Las Jefas: The Changing Role of Women in Latin American Drug Trafficking Organizations

A presentation organized as part of the Carr Center's Working Group on Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery. Matt Herbert, Pre-Doctoral Fellow, The World Peace Foundation and PhD Candidate, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy presented: "Las Jefas: The Changing Role of Women in Latin American Drug Trafficking Organizations" this event took place on Dec. 12, 2013.

Good things don’t come to an end. They spread….

Originally Published by the World Peace Foundation Reinventing Peace Blog

This post is the second of a two-part series on Somali piracy by Matt Herbert and David Knoll. 

Maritime piracy, thought by many to be a quaint relic of history, is booming. Modern-day buccaneers have upgraded from swords to AK-47s and spyglasses to GPS, but their motive remains the same: profit. Traditionally, pirate groups made a risk-reward calculation: operations that had higher earning potential also came with higher risk of interdiction. Somali pirates have upended this risk-reward tradeoff, by pioneering hijack-ransom piracy, a technique that minimizes their risk, while maximizing their profits. While successful, so far this type of piracy has remained limited to the waters near Somalia. This article will explore whether this innovative technique is poised to spread beyond the Horn of Africa.

Of late, the international community has found success in the fight against Somali piracy. Intensive efforts by an international naval flotilla in the western Indian Ocean, new protection efforts by shipping companies, and increasing chaos in Somalia have led to a dramatic drop in the number of Somali pirate attacks.

(Data from ICC/International Maritime Bureau – Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships Reports from 2004-2012)

While an impressive and laudable achievement, the international community’s recent triumph has highlighted a concerning global trend: the rise of piracy in the 21st century. Over the last quarter century the number of reported acts of maritime piracy have tripled; the number of unreported acts is likely higher. The drivers of this increase are the mega-trends of the 21st century: trade, inequality, and geo-demographics. The globalization-driven increase in international maritime trade has increased the number of targets for pirates. Developing countries have experienced rapid economic growth associated with this boom, but the growth has been unequal, birthing a large dislocated population, bereft of opportunity, and thus willing to take risks. This massive group comprises the recruiting ground for potential pirates. Finally, there has been a dramatic increase of urban populations in littoral zones. The clustering of dispossessed populations in urban areas with easy access to maritime targets is acting as a long-term driver of maritime attacks. The presence of organized crime groups in many of these areas will help to ensure that piracy in the coming years will be well organized, professional, and difficult to stop.

(Data from ICC International Maritime Bureau – Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships Reports from 2004-2012)

The most financially lucrative form of piracy in the modern age has been hijack-ransom. While structural conditions – state weakness, existence of organized groups, and proximity to high value vessels – allowed the development of Somali piracy, it was their innovative technique that made them successful. Techniques can, and often do, spread, which begs the question: can ransom-hijack model piracy spread and if so, where?

Innovation diffusion theory is a useful framework for understanding how hijack-ransom piracy might spread. The concept explains how innovations proliferate through networks. There are five characteristics of an innovation that make it more or less diffusible: relative advantage, compatibility, trialability, observability, and complexity. Looking at the first four characteristics, hijack-ransom piracy comes out as easily transferable. The relative advantage—high profitability and low risk—is obvious. The technique is compatible with the practices and equipment available to most maritime criminal groups. And because it does not require extensive retooling in terms of gear, hijack-ransom piracy is trialable. A group can try this type of piracy and if they don’t like it, revert to their previous operational model without much lost investment. Lastly, the Somali style piracy is easily observable—it happens in the open and garners worldwide press coverage. Any group thinking of adopting the method will see numerous examples of the success of hijack-ransom piracy.

It is the last characteristic, complexity, which potentially hinders the diffusion of Somali-style piracy. The infrastructure necessary to support hijack-ransom piracy is more complex than is commonly assumed. In addition to the intricacy of the operations themselves, hijack-ransom pirate organizations require a number of key specialists, in addition to the foot soldiers that make up the bulk of the groups. They need negotiators to communicate with shipping companies to secure ransoms. Logisticians ensure that adequate food, water, and qat are available for a prolonged hostage situation. Finally, sustaining pirate operations, during the commandeering phase, and especially during the hostage state, is expensive, so investors are required.

The complexity of hijack-ransom piracy means that any diffusion of the technique must include the transfer of both tacit and explicit knowledge to potential adopter groups. Tacit knowledge is expert knowledge that is not easily expressed. For example this would include the knowledge of how to find a valuable ship, how to keep hostages alive, and how to negotiate with an international shipping company. Explicit knowledge is direct and easily expressed knowledge. Explicit knowledge is the operational knowledge an adopter could gain from reading a descriptive newspaper account of a pirate attack. Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, can only be transferred directly from an expert to a new user.

Knowledge is transferred through two types of communication channels: mass and interpersonal. Mass communication is unidirectional and reaches large, heterogeneous audiences. It includes such mediums as newspapers and television. Interpersonal communication is interactive and takes place between individuals or in small groups. Explicit information travels effectively and swiftly via mass communication channels. There has certainly been enough coverage of Somali piracy in the international press to provide a potential adopter with all the required explicit information. However, explicit knowledge alone is not sufficient: without tacit knowledge a pirate group will not have enough information to adopt hijack-ransom piracy. For innovation to spread, both explicit and tacit information must reach a potential adopter.

Tacit information is transmitted via interpersonal channels, which are interactive, allowing for back and forth between a potential adopter and a current user. Interpersonal interaction mostly occurs between people who know each other, or in other words, individuals or groups that share common characteristics: religion, ideology, ethnicity, or geographic proximity.

Therefore, in looking at the locations where hijack-ransom piracy could spread, one of the key markers is the existence of actors who have network connections to Somalia’s pirate groups. These actors are the ones that Somali pirates interact with most frequently and are positioned to receive the tacit knowledge necessary to adopt Somali hijack-ransom piracy. There are two likely networks through which Somali piracy might diffuse: the Somali Diaspora and Al-Qaeda linked groups. The Somali Diaspora is global, though it has concentrations in East Africa, Europe and the U.S. There is anecdotal evidence of connections between Al-Qaeda (and affiliates) and Somali pirates, and there is certainly enough circumstantial evidence to assume that information passes between the groups. Additionally, the areas of southern Somalia under Al-Shabaab control represent the largest area “held” by an Al-Qaeda affiliated group, and have attracted a host of international militants.

In addition to looking at areas with pirate-linked network presence, we also looked at areas with the structural conditions in place to support hijack-ransom piracy. These are: state weakness, existence of organized groups, and proximity to high value vessels. Pirate groups must have a secure area to organize and a harbor to secure the hijacked vessel without fear of interdiction. They do not require a completely failed state, merely ungoverned coastal territory in which they can operate unhindered.  The complexity of hijack-ransom piracy makes the presence of organized armed groups necessary for piracy to be effective. These groups have the organizational and financial capital necessary to carry out sophisticated hijack-ransom pirate operations. And most obviously, pirate groups must be located near high value shipping. Hijack-ransom piracy takes the revenue-generation capacity of a vessel hostage, so pirates need to be near not just international shipping, but high value vessels to make the enterprise worthwhile.

To find potential diffusion areas, we overlaid the two sets of vectors (structural conditions and Somali pirate networks) and looked for areas where all the factors intersected. We found four areas to which Somali piracy could potential spread. The first is in Southeast Asia, primarily in Indonesian, Malaysian and Filipino waters, which have a long history of piracy and a high concentration of global shipping. The region has several Al-Qaeda affiliate organizations, which have a history of sending personnel to various Al-Qaeda operational theaters. The second is the Gulf of Guinea, which has recently seen a spike in piracy, although thus far not the hijack-ransom variety. The region hosts a number of organized militant and piratic groups who would likely be interested in the technique, as well as the presence of Boko Haram, which is believed to have received some training in Somalia. The third is the Strait of Hormuz; however, the proximity of this area to Somalia increases the likelihood that pirates interested in operating around the Strait will opt for bases in Somalia. The last area is the Libyan coast, which is close to high value global shipping going through the Suez Canal. Despite being proximal to developed countries with powerful navies, Libya has all the factors to make it susceptible to hijack-ransom piracy: the state is weak, and there is a concentrated presence of organized crime groups, many of which are associated with Al-Qaeda. There is even a Somali Diaspora presence in the area associated with illicit maritime activities.

It’s important to highlight what this analysis is and is not. It is not intended to be a Magic 8 Ball, able to predict precisely if and where hijack-ransom piracy where emerge. Neither should it be read as an assertion that the Somali Diaspora, or, for that matter Al-Qaeda members, are all latent pirates. They are not. However, they do represent networks with strong internal communication that could facilitate the spread of knowledge between disparate regions. With this analysis, we have tried to think critically about how Somali model piracy could spread, what conditions may facilitate it, and the role of various networks in the diffusion of the innovation. The utility of pinpointing areas at risk – such as the Gulf of Guinea and Libya – is that it enables national governments and the international community to proactively work to mitigate the chance the technique might emerge. Sound policy and well-designed aid programs can address some, though not all, of the structural factors – state weakness and the ability of organized crime groups to operate with impunity – as well as some of the mega-trends – inequality and societal dislocation – which foster piracy in the first place. Such proactive policies are expensive, but they are a fraction of the tens of billions of dollars which hijack-ransom could annually cost the global economy.

Somalia’s Innovating Pirates

Originally Published by the World Peace Foundation Reinventing Peace Blog

By Matt Herbert and David Knoll

The MT Smyrni, a Liberian flagged Tanker, was sailing 250 nautical miles off the Omani coast when pirates were sighted. The pirates closed fast, attacking with automatic weapons. The crew was able to drive the pirates off once, but a second attack overwhelmed the Smyrni. Within moments the vessel had been commandeered, the 26 crewmembers kidnapped, and a new course set towards the Somali coast. The ship’s owners were contacted, ransom negotiation initiated, and its crew held hostage to hedge against attempts to forcefully free the vessel. Ten months later the pirates received $9.5 million dollars, and the owners of the Smyrni received their ship back.

The attack on the MT Smyrni is hardly unique. Over the last eight years, Somali pirates have emerged as perhaps the most successful maritime brigands of the modern age. Between 2005 and 2011, they hijacked 218 vessels and held 3,741 sailors hostage. Their operations peaked between 2010 and 2012, when roughly 3,000 Somali pirates extorted $429.37 million for the global shipping community.

Somali pirates operate well out into the Indian Ocean, extending from the Bab El Mandab Strait to the Maldives. In at least one case, Somali pirates were encountered off the south Indian coast. In an era of increasingly globalized and professionalized crime, Somalia’s pirates have demonstrated that opportunities for lucrative illicit gain still exist on the high seas, albeit without eye patches and peg legs.

Their attention grabbing, large-scale attacks served to remind the world that piracy is not dead, but has simply changed forms. Apart from the direct costs of the ransoms, shippers faced increased insurance premiums on vessels sailing past Somalia. In some cases, shipping companies chose to reroute vessels away from the western Indian Ocean all together, at considerable expense and time. Some estimates peg the annual impact of Somali piracy on the global economy at $18 billion.

The high cost of Somali piracy begs the question: how have they been able to achieve such success? Analyses of Somali piracy have focused on the structural dynamics in Somalia. The most frequently cited enabling factor is weak state authority. Minimal state presence allows pirates to organize and operate with little fear of arrest or interdiction. State weakness also impedes the growth of legitimate industries, incentivizing young men to turn to piracy.

Other analyses have focused on the availability of ships off the coast of Somalia. International shipping relies heavily on the Suez Canal and Bab El Mandab Strait as a shortcut from the Mediterranean to South and East Asia. Add in the tankers moving oil from the Persian Gulf to South and East Asia, and the waters of the Western Indian Ocean are packed with all manner of high value vessels. Despite the threats posed by Somali pirates, it is economically prohibitive for most shipping companies to reroute their cargo, ensuring that prey remains aplenty for pirates.

These structural factors are important in explaining the emergence of Somali piracy, but they are ineffective in explaining its economic success. Somali pirate attacks regularly yield million dollar payoffs. By comparison, pirates in other areas of the globe are often lucky if they can get ten thousand dollars. The main driver of this differential is the innovative nature of Somali pirate operations.

Traditionally, pirates hijacked vessels to steal money, cargo, the ship, or kidnap individuals onboard. These methods all involve a risk-reward tradeoff. Stealing shipboard items such as money or small amounts of cargo is low risk, but not lucrative. Alternatively, trying to steal an entire ship and reregister it is lucrative, but unlikely to be successful and could involve state violence. A large proportion of pirate attacks are basically opportunistic crimes – one or two pirates slipping on board an anchored vessel, stealing money or goods from the ship, and rapidly fleeing. The pirates perpetrating such attacks are generally unorganized and unskilled.

Somali pirates, by contrast, are highly organized groups of men who hold specialized skills. The Somali model is encapsulated in the MT Smyrni episode. Pirates use motherships — often hijacked fishing vessels — and small skiffs to stalk vessels steaming through the Indian Ocean. Once spotted, the pirates use speed and violence to swarm the target and take it over. It is then steered back to the Somali coast, where the vessel’s owner is contacted and a ransom demanded.

The detention of the vessel’s crew creates a hostage situation, deterring attempts by military forces to regain control. Instead major shipping companies pay the ransom quickly to ensure the safety of the crew and to get the ship back into revenue generating status. Once the ransom has been paid, the vessel and its crew is released, and the pirates return to the sea try again.

While the Somali model of piracy involves aspects of traditional operational models of piracy, including vessel hijacking and crew kidnapping, it differs in how it leverages value from its victims. Instead of having to engage in the messy task of selling a vessel, or the non-lucrative seizure of the currency aboard, the Somali pirates have realized that simply extorting international shipping companies can garner large profits. The companies in turn are incentivized to negotiate by the high value of the ships seized, the physical threat to the crew, and the significant cost of their vessel being idled. The cost of an idle vessel can be particularly acute, with some estimates putting the daily cost at $17,500 for a bulk carrier.

The hijack-ransom is shocking in its simplicity and impressive in its profitability. What makes this method effective is not simply the enabling conditions, but the innovative operational methods that have been introduced. The recent success of the international community to slow Somali piracy might convince some that the threat has been removed, however the factors that produced hijack-ransom piracy are in place in other regions indicating that Somali-style piracy could be poised to spread. A forthcoming post will address how hijack-ransom piracy might proliferate.